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Abstract
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construction sector can go a long way toward explaining a significant fraction of
the rising trends in wealth-to-income ratios, housing wealth, and wealth inequal-
ity, that have been documented in most advanced countries at least since the
’70s. This mechanism (which we label housing cost disease) has adverse effects
on social welfare when the Planner puts sufficient weight on the less wealthy
households.
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1 Introduction
Wealth-to-income ratios have been increasing in most advanced economies at least
since the 1970s, and housing wealth, which accounts for about 35% of the total, has
been the main driver in many countries. Because wealth is more unevenly distributed
than income, a concern for a widening inequality gap is emerging in academic and
non-academic circles. In fact, in advanced countries, wealth inequality, while declining
in the period 1950 to 1970, has been increasing at least since 1980.
A growing literature suggests that to understand the existing trends in wealth in-
equality, wealth ratios and income shares, it is crucial to analyze the dynamics of
housing, since much of the long-term dynamics of the capital-income ratio, as well as
the net capital share of income, is accounted for by housing wealth and, in particular,
by rising housing prices (for example, Bonnet et al. (2014), Piketty and Zucman (2014),
Rognlie (2014) and Summers (2014)). Following this literature, we provide an explana-
tion of these long run trends based on a sort of Baumol’s cost disease. In particular, we
build a frictionless two-sector life-cycle model with bequests able to replicate some of
the stylized facts concerning the dynamics of total wealth, housing wealth, and wealth
inequality, as a consequence of an improvement in the efficiency of labor in the rest of
the economy relative to the construction sector.
In the seminal work by Baumol (1967), a market economy has two sectors pro-
ducing two goods using labor as the only input and enjoying different patterns of
technological progress. Under perfect labor mobility and wage equalization, a rising
labor productivity in the dynamic sector, relative to the stagnant sector, generates a
higher production cost and, then, a rising relative output price in the stagnant sec-
tor. If the demand of the stagnant sector output is sufficiently inelastic, labor will
move to this sector and aggregate output growth may decline. We extend Baumol’s
analysis to a life-cycle model with bequests (generated by parental altruism). The two
sectors are called construction and manufacturing, where the former should be inter-
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preted as production of buildings and constructions and the latter as capturing the
non-construction sectors of the economy. Technology employs capital and land, as well
as labor, and construction plays the role of the stagnant sector, while manufacturing
experiences labor-augmenting technological progress. Assuming an altruistic bequest
motive, we define the conditions for a rise in the efficiency of labor in manufacturing
to generate a housing price appreciation, a rise in the wealth-to-income ratio (mostly
driven by a higher housing appreciation and a weak dynamic in average labor produc-
tivity) and in the size of bequests (i.e., a rising wealth inequality). We refer to this set
of results as the housing cost disease. Data for the 8 largest advanced economies over
the period 1970-2010 confirm the existence of a positive and large correlation between
a labor-augmenting productivity residual in the rest of the economy, relative to the
construction sector, and the total and housing wealth-to-income ratios. A multi-sector
approach is important to study the evolution of the wealth composition in advanced
economies (vs. economies in the early stage of the development process) since housing
replaced land in households’ assets and because factor price equalization across sectors
generates interesting linkages between the dynamics of productivity and asset prices.
We solve the model analytically, at the steady state and under the assumptions
of constant productivity growth rate and Cobb-Douglas production function in the
residential construction sector, and show that the housing cost disease is most likely
when manufacturing is more capital intensive than construction, housing demand is
sufficiently inelastic with respect to its own price and the land share of income is not
too large. The housing demand elasticity and the elasticity of substitution between
factors play an important role. In particular, with unitary elasticity of substitution be-
tween capital and labor in construction, and between goods (consumption and housing
services), in a CES representation of preferences, a rising relative productivity in man-
ufacturing is allocation neutral, in the sense that total and housing wealth-to-income
ratios, as well as bequests, remain unchanged. When, instead, housing demand is suf-
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ficiently inelastic, the housing cost disease holds and bequests, and thus inequality,
increase with relative productivity in manufacturing. The robustness of these results
is studied numerically for a CES specification of preferences and technology. We show
that, for a 75% increase in the (exogenous) relative labor-augmenting efficiency in
manufacturing (a value that we consider a good estimation of the actual average im-
provements between 1970 and 2010 for advanced economies), total wealth-to-income
increases by about 7.5 percent and housing wealth by approximately 27 percent. These
patterns are driven by a strong increase in the housing price (about 60 percent). Since
the interest rate is greater than the population growth rate at equilibrium, steady state
net bequests (i.e., the difference between the present value of bequests received from
the previous generation and those left to the next one) are a positive component of
the rich households’ present value of income. Then, assuming that housing is a normal
good, bequests and housing wealth are correlated, and this dependence is stronger the
higher the equilibrium level of the interest rate.
We are not the first to highlight the importance of disaggregated productivity im-
provements, and changes in the allocation of inputs across sectors, to explain move-
ments in housing prices and wealth. Some notable examples are Davis and Heathcote
(2005), Kahn (2008), Iacoviello and Neri (2010), Li and Zeng (2010), Moro and Nuno
(2012), and, more recently, Favilukis et al. (2015) and Grossmann and Steger (2016). In
particular, Moro and Nuno provide some evidence that a fall in the relative TFP in the
construction sector may be responsible for a surge in housing prices, and Grossmann
and Steger highlight the scarcity of land as a contributing factor for the increase in
wealth-to-income ratios. Li and Zeng (2010) develop a two-sector neoclassical growth
model with housing and show that sectoral differences in productivities could explain
the secular growth of housing prices. They show that there exists a negative relation,
off the balanced growth path, between house prices and real interest rates as long
as the housing sector is more labor intensive. Most of the other contributions focus
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on business cycle analysis and credit frictions. Our life-cycle model incorporates land
and bequests, which provide additional channels to explain changes in housing prices,
wealth composition, inequality and their welfare implications.
Our theory complements, rather than replaces, alternative explanations of these
stylized facts based on financial constraints (for example, Favilukis et al. (2015) and
Iacoviello (2005)), regulation and the supply of housing and land (for example, Hsieh
and Moretti (2015) and Knoll et al. (2017)), precautionary saving (for example, Gour-
inchas and Parker (2002) and Castaneda et al. (2003)), as well as the saving induced
growth mechanism advocated by Piketty and Zucman (2014) who attribute the rising
wealth-to-income ratios to the falling income growth rates and the long-run stability
of the saving rate1. Piketty and Saez (2014) claim that these trends are responsi-
ble for the rising income and wealth inequality. Bonnet et al. (2014), Rognlie (2014)
and Weil (2015) argue that the existing trends in wealth-to-income ratios and income
shares are strongly determined by the dynamic of housing wealth and capital gains.
Other contributions explain the observed stylized facts with a combination of alterna-
tive assumptions, such as heterogeneous bequest motives, rate of returns shocks and
incomplete markets (as in Krusell and Smith (1998), Hendricks (2007), Benhabib et
al. (2011), Benhabib et al. (2015)), or endogenous rates of return due to entrepreneur-
ship or human capital (as in Galor and Zeira (1993), Quadrini (2000), Cagetti and
De Nardi (2006) and many others). Our model borrows some of the ingredients em-
ployed in this literature, within a drastically simplified framework, to explain the rising
wealth inequality that goes along with a change in the sectoral composition of GDP.
In particular, as in Favilukis et al. (2015), we focus on the role of bequests in gener-
ating wealth inequality by assuming that altruistic finitely-lived households have fixed
heterogeneous discount rates and that parents cannot force gifts on their children (one-
1See, in particular, the detailed survey by De Nardi and Fang (2015) and Leung (2004) for a review
of the literature.
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sided altruism)2. This heterogeneity generates a partition of the set of households at
steady states into a subset of rich individuals receiving bequests from their parents and
a subset of poor individuals receiving (and giving) no bequests. Although the assump-
tion of heterogeneous bequest motives across individuals as a driver of wealth inequality
is not new and it has been widely exploited in the existing literature, we supplement
this theory by suggesting that the Baumol cost disease may amplify bequests-induced
inequality through relative productivity improvements. In particular, our model shows
that, when housing demand is sufficiently inelastic with respect to its own price, private
wealth, housing prices and bequests are complementary.
Piketty (2014) advocates the institution of a wealth tax on the assumption that
the increase in wealth-to-income is not desirable because of the implications in terms
of unequal distribution of wealth across households. However, if this phenomenon is
mostly a consequence of rising housing prices, then policies targeting specifically the
housing sector are probably more appropriate, as noted for example by Auerbach and
Hasset (2015)3. We leave for future research the evaluation of such policies, and use,
instead, the model to see if a change in the composition of wealth toward housing,
following a rise of efficiency in manufacturing, is welfare improving. Since households
are heterogeneous with respect to private wealth composition, the answer is ambiguous.
In particular, in the case of a housing cost disease, a housing appreciation due to
productivity improvements has two opposite effects on individuals’ welfare: it raises
bequests and old individuals’ housing wealth, but is also makes housing less affordable.
The latter (negative) effect is the only one affecting the poor young households’ welfare.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model,
the conditions for a housing cost disease to occur, and presents our analytical results.
2The role of bequests in generating wealth inequality can be hardly ignored. For the US, Gale
and Scholz (1994) find that intergenerational transfers account for at least 50-60% of total wealth
accumulation.
3Note that housing taxation is, in any case, very controversial, since housing is a consumption
good, as well as an asset, and home ownership is much more evenly distributed across individuals
than stocks and other financial assets.
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Section 5 provides a quantitative analysis of the model under a reasonable calibration.
Section 6 presents the empirical evidence supporting our conjecture. Section 7 discusses
the welfare implications. Section 8 concludes.
2 The Model
In this section we present a simple life-cycle model with bequests, two sectors (con-
struction and manufacturing), two assets (business capital and housing), and exoge-
nous technical progress. The manufacturing sector stands to represent all the non-
construction sectors of the economy. Both sectors use labor and capital, and land is
used in construction only. The model is used in sections 4 and 5 to show analytically
and numerically that, when housing demand is sufficiently inelastic and the construc-
tion sector less capital intensive than manufacturing, an increase in labor efficiency
in manufacturing generates a sizable increase in the steady state values of total and
housing wealth-to-income ratios, bequests (i.e., wealth inequality) and housing prices.
There are two sectors, construction (h) and manufacturing (m). Firms in both
sectors are price-takers and labor and capital are fully mobile across the two sectors.
The production functions are
Y ht = F
h(Kht , A
h
tL
h
t , Zt), Y
m
t = F
m(Kmt , A
m
t L
m
t ), (1)
where Kj and Lj are the amounts of capital and labor employed in the two sectors, Aj
is a labor-augmenting technological level and Zt represents the flow of additional land
available for residential development. For analytical convenience, we assume that F h
and Fm are strictly concave, they exhibit constant returns to scale, with Fm satisfy-
ing standard Inada type conditions, and F h belongs to the class of CES productions
functions with elasticity of substitution between inputs defined by σh.
As in Davis and Heathcote (2005) and Favilukis et al. (2015), Z is a combination
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of land and government permits. Note that we are implicitly assuming that past flows
of new housing do not reduce the land stock available for the current production of
housing. We let the flow of additional land permits for residential development, Z, be
time-dependent because the government, or some other public authority, may decide
to change it to enact specific policies or respond to demographic variables. To simplify
the exposition, we assume that the proceeds from selling land permits are used by
the government to finance wasteful government spending. Our definition of housing
production is not limited to new buildings on previously unused land, but includes
rebuilding, renovation and construction of new floors of existing houses.
It is convenient to normalize variables with respect to the level of labor efficiency.
In particular, let kj = Kj/AjLj be the sector-specific capital intensities, z = Z/AhLh
the available land per unit of labor efficiency in construction and yj the sector-specific
labor productivities in efficiency units. By constant returns to scale, the intensive-form
production functions are
yh = F h(kh, 1, z) ≡ fh(kh, z) ym = Fm(km, 1) ≡ fm(km).
Let a = Am/Ah be the labor-augmenting efficiency in manufacturing relative to con-
struction (henceforth relative productivity); qh the price of a unit of new housing; r the
real interest rate; w = W/Am the wage rate per units of efficiency in the manufacturing
sector; Rz the real rental rate of land (imposed by the regulator or the government
agency); and denote with fhk and f
h
z the partial derivatives of f
h(kh, z) with respect to
kh and z, respectively. Then, profit maximization at any interior solution implies
1 + r = fmk = q
hfhk , (2)
w = fm − kmfmk = (qh/a)[fh − khfhk − zfhz ], (3)
Rz = qhfhz . (4)
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By the properties of the production functions, the above equations provide a well
defined map from (r, a) into (w, kh, km) for all a > 0 and r in a suitable interval.
Importantly, the CES representation for F h implies that the profit maximizing val-
ues of the capital-labor ratios under factor price equalization are independent of the
amount of land, Z. In particular, by the stated assumptions, it is readily verified
that, for any given strictly positive (r, a), with r ∈ A = [r, r¯], there is a unique solu-
tion, (w(r), kh(r, a), km(r)) (independent of z), to equations (2), (3), as a differentiable
function of (r, a), such that w, kh and km are all decreasing in r. Further more, the
elasticities of kh and qh with respect to a (for given land to labor ratio, z) are given by
kˆha =
∂kh/kh
∂a/a
= σh, qˆha = 1− Shk , (5)
where, as mentioned above, σh represents the elasticity of substitution between in-
puts in the CES production function and Shk = fhk kh/fh is the capital share in the
construction sector.
A set Lt of households, growing at a rate n ≥ 0, is born every period t. Households
live for two periods, supply labor time inelastically in young age only, and have identical
time-invariant preferences for manufacturing consumption and housing services, the
latter being measured by the housing stock. Households are characterized by some
degree of altruism with respect to their offsprings defined by an individual specific
discount rate of the next generation’s utility. In particular, households born at time t
belong to different types, indexed by i, with i in a finite set I, and each type i composed
of a mass mi of individuals (i.e., a collection of positive numbers, (mi)i∈I , such that∑
i∈Imi = 1), with life-time utility defined by:
V t,i = u(Cy,it , C
o,i
t+1, H
i
t+1) + θi(1 + n)V
t+1,i,
for all t ≥ 0, where (Cy,it , Co,it+1) are age-contingent consumptions, H it+1 is the housing
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stock acquired by the household in young age and u(.) is a standard increasing, concave
function to be specified in a later section and the (inter-generational) discount factors
satisfy θi(1 + n) < 1 for all i ∈ I. The upper bound on the discount rates, θi, insures
convergence of each dynasty’s long-run utility function.
We assume perfect financial markets allowing for unlimited lending and borrowing.
Any household born at time t acquires residential property when young, enjoys the
housing services generated by it, resells the property when old and leaves some bequests
to the offsprings. Then, the budget constraints in their two periods of life are
Cy,it + qtH
i
t+1 +D
i
t+1/(1 + rt+1) = Wt +B
i
t, (6)
Co,it+1 +B
i
t+1 = D
i
t+1 + qt+1(1− δ)H it+1, (7)
where Di denotes units of a one period financial asset, Bi denotes inter vivos bequests,
W is the real wage and δ ∈ (0, 1) is the housing depreciation rate. The above reduce
to a single inter-temporal budget constraint
Cy,it +
Co,it+1
1 + rt+1
+ pitH
i
t+1 +
(1 + n)Bit+1
1 + rt+1
= Wt +B
i
t, (8)
where
pit = q
h
t − (1− δ)qht+1/(1 + rt+1)
is the user cost of housing. Denoting with uij,t the partial derivative of u(C
y,i
t , C
o,i
t+1, H
i
t+1)
with respect to the j-th argument, standard Euler equations reduce to
ui1,t = (1 + rt+1)u
i
2,t, u
i
1,tpit = u
i
3,t. (9)
Since parental altruism is one-sided, we rule out forced gifts from children to par-
ents, and impose the non-negativity constraint Bit+1 ≥ 0. Then, by the the budget
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constraints (8), the optimal allocation of bequests is defined by
ui2,t ≥ θiui1,t+1, (10)
together with the complementary slackness condition
Bit+1
(
ui2,t − θiui1,t+1
)
= 0. (11)
From the above budget constraints and first order conditions we derive the time-t
households’ saving, Sit , demand for housing, H
i
t+1, and supply of bequests, B
i
t+1.
Letting K, L and H be the total stocks of business capital, labor and housing, a
first set of equilibrium conditions imply
Lt = L
h
t + L
m
t , (12)
Kt = K
h
t +K
m
t , (13)
Ht+1 = Y
h
t + (1− δ)Ht. (14)
From now on we define with λt = L
h
t /Lt the share of labor in the housing sector and
express all equilibrium restrictions and the relevant variables in units of labor efficiency
(relative to the manufacturing sector). In particular, letting
kt = Kt/A
m
t Lt, ht = Ht/A
m
t Lt, 1 + g
m
t+1 = A
m
t+1/A
m
t ,
we can replace the full employment conditions (12), (13) and (14) with
kt = λtk
h
t /at + (1− λt)kmt , (15)
(1 + n)(1 + gmt+1)ht+1 = λty
h
t /at + (1− δ)ht (16)
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and λt ∈ [0, 1]. To close the model we define the aggregate saving and housing demand
per unit of efficiency
st ≡
∑
i
miS
i/Amt , (17)
hdt+1 ≡
∑
i
miH
i
t+1Lt/A
m
t+1Lt+1, (18)
and impose market clearing in the the housing and capital markets, i.e.,
ht+1 = h
d
t+1, (19)
(1 + n)(1 + gmt+1)(kt+1 + q
h
t ht+1) = st. (20)
By the properties of the production functions, profit maximization and factor price
equalization at an interior solution, i.e., equations (2) and (3), we recall that
kmt = k
m(rt), k
h
t = k
h(rt, at), wt = w(rt), (21)
and
qht = (1 + rt)/f
h(kht , zt) ≡ qh(rt, at, zt). (22)
Recall that the functions in (21) and (22) are positive and continuous and guarantee
an interior allocation of factors across sectors for r in A = [r, r¯) and all a > 0. Then,
an interior competitive equilibrium is a positive sequence,
{kt, kht , kmt , λt, ht, bt, rt+1, wt, qht }∞t=0,
with rt+1 ∈ A and pit = qht − (1 − δ)qht+1/(1 + rt+1) > 0 for all t ≥ 0, satisfying the
households’ optimality conditions (8), (9), (10), (11), the market clearing conditions
(15)-(20), the factor price equalization conditions (21), for all t ≥ 0, for a given sequence
of relative productivities, {at}∞t=0, flows of housing permits, {zt}∞t=0 and some initial
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conditions, (k0, h0, r0) > 0. Given the assumption that the proceeds from selling land
permits are used for wasteful government spending, we can neglect the government
balanced budget condition since it has no impact on equilibrium variables.
3 Steady States with Two Types
From now on we concentrate on a steady state equilibrium where all relevant variables
are time invariant in units of labor efficiency (in manufacturing) and the economy
grows at a constant growth rate. Evidently, this implies that labor efficiency grows at
the same rate in the two sectors, i.e.,
Amt+1/A
m
t = A
h
t+1/A
h
t ≡ 1 + g,
otherwise the relative productivity parameter, at, would be growing (or falling) at a
constant rate and this would in turn generate ever increasing (or decreasing) relative
prices. This assumption, of course, does not imply that the two sectors must have the
same level of labor efficiency, and we will be studying the effects of a rise in the relative
productivity, a, across steady states as well as in a transition between steady states.
Remember that the flow of land permits, Zt, is set according to some rule determined
by a public authority. It is reasonable and consistent with the notion of a steady
state equilibrium to impose that this rule follows the demographic and technological
evolution of the economy in such a way as to impose a constant cost (represented by
Rz in equation (4)) on the firms operating in the housing sector. Then, we assume that
z is time invariant. However, it should be kept in mind that this is only a convenient
assumption. If Zt grew less than the labor efficiency in the construction sector, land
would become relatively scarcer over time, and this would amplify the impact of a
rising a on housing prices. Hence, our assumption shuts down an additional mechanism
feeding the sort of cost disease that we are looking for in this paper.
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For simplicity, we will also make two simplifying assumptions. First, the instan-
taneous utility function, u(.), belongs to the CES class with elasticity of substitution
between goods denoted by γ. In particular,
u(Cy,i, Co,i, H i) =

[
χy(Cy,i)
γ−1
γ + χo(Co,i)
γ−1
γ + χh(H i)
γ−1
γ
] γ
γ−1
if γ 6= 1,
(Cy,i)χ
y
(Co,i)χ
o
(H i)χ
h
otherwise,
(23)
where χj > 0 for j = y, o, h and
∑
j=y,o,h χ
j = 1. Importantly, the CES hypothe-
sis guarantees normality, unitary elasticity of consumption and housing demand with
respect to income, and the ”law of demand” (demand for housing decreasing in its
own price). The second assumption is that there are two types of households only.
In particular, letting I = {p, r} and θr > θp, we say that household type r is rich
and household type p is poor, although we could as well say that the former is more
altruistic than the latter with respect to their own children.
Under this specification, and by the first order conditions (9)–(11), it is clear that
we may have two types of steady states. In the first, r ≤ (1− θr)/θr and no individual
leaves any bequests, so that the resulting equilibrium is equivalent to the one that
would take place in a canonical overlapping generations economy. In the second, the
rich individuals leave positive bequests, whereas the poor leave zero bequests at any
time. In particular, at a PBSS we have
r = (1− θr)/θr ≡ r∗ < (1− θp)/θp.
We refer to the first type of equilibrium as a zero bequests steady state (ZBSS) and to
the second type as a positive bequests steady state (PBSS). In what follows, we focus
exclusively on the latter mostly because it allows for a sharp characterization of intra-
generational inequality. It is understood that a PBSS is assumed to be interior, i.e.,
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to imply that both sectors are active. In particular, we impose that
lim
km→0
fmk > min
i∈I
1/θi > lim
km→∞
fmk .
The above implies that a PBSS exists and it is such that the wage rate per unit
of efficiency is uniquely fixed at w(r∗), whereas w ≥ w(r∗) at a steady state with
zero bequests. Recalling that any interior allocation provides km = km(r), kh =
kh(r, a), yh = yh(r, a, z), qh(r, a, z) the allocation of the capital-labor ratios is uniquely
determined by (r∗, a) for given z. Hence, there are five remaining equilibrium variables
to be determined by the steady state equilibrium conditions characterizing a PBSS:
the average capital stock, k, the share of labor in construction, λ, the housing stock, h,
and the steady state bequest of the rich household, b, all of them uniquely determined
by (r∗, a) and by the market clearing conditions (15)-(20) at steady state.
Now denote with lower case letters the variables in units of labor efficiency at steady
state, so that, for j = y, o,
cj,i = Cj,it /A
m
t , s
i = Sit/A
m
t , b
i = Bit/A
m
t , h
i = H it+1/A
m
t+1.
By the CES utility specification, all variables exhibit a unitary income elasticity. Then,
denoting with I it the household’s present value of income in t, and setting
(1 + n)(1 + g) = 1 + ζ,
we derive
cy,i = φy(pi, r)I it/A
m
t ,
co,i
1 + r
= φo(pi, r)I it/A
m
t , pih
i(1 + g) = φh(pi, r)I it/A
m
t ,
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where, at steady state,
I it/A
m
t = w +
(
r − ζ
1 + r
)
bi
and φj(pi, r) ∈ (0, 1) (for j = y, o, h) are the expenditure shares. Importantly, for
j = y, o, h, φj(pi, r) are all continuous functions and such that
∂φy(pi)/∂pi ≤ 0, ∂φo(pi)/∂pi ≤ 0, ∂φy(pi)/∂pi ≥ 0
if and only if γ < 1, and ∂φj(pi)/∂pi = 0 for j = y, o, h for γ = 1. Furthermore,
households’ savings per unit of labor efficiency is
si = (1− φy(pi, r))w +
(
1 + (1− φy(pi, r))r + φy(pi, r)ζ
1 + r
)
.
Observe that, by the normality of housing and consumption, the households’ housing
demand and saving are both increasing in bequests under the condition r > ζ ≥ 0.
Hence, higher bequests generate more housing demand and more saving for the rich
individual relative to the poor at the PBSS. More specifically, the impact of a rising
bequest on saving is greater than the impact on the money spent on housing4, i.e.,
∂si/∂bi > qh∂hi/∂bi > 0. (24)
These properties are exploited in the next section to show that a rising relative pro-
ductivity may go along with a rising housing wealth and rising bequests.
By aggregating across households at steady state (cf. equations (17)-(20)), we get
the following expressions for the aggregate steady state levels of housing demand and
4Notice that these inequalities are not specific of the CES utility representations, but rather hold
also in a more general setting under the conditions of normality and r > ζ ≥ 0.
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savings in units of labor efficiency
hd =
(
φh(pi, r)
(1 + ζ)pi
)(
w +
(
r − ζ
1 + r
)
b
)
, (25)
s = (1− φy(pi, r))w +
(
1 + (1− φy(pi, r))r + φy(pi, r)ζ
1 + r
)
b, (26)
and the set of equilibrium conditions (15)-(20) at steady state are
k = λkh(r, a)/a+ (1− λ)km(r), (27)
(δ + ζ)h = λyh(r, a)/a, (28)
h = hd, (29)
(1 + ζ)(k + qh) = s. (30)
4 Some Analytical Results
We can now explore under what conditions our model replicates some of the features
of the two-sector economy studied by Baumol (1967), with construction of housing
playing the role of the stagnant sector and manufacturing the role of the dynamic
sector. We recall that the Baumol’s cost disease holds if, following a rise in productivity
in the dynamic sector, (a) the relative price of the stagnant sector output increases
(price increase); (b) the stagnant industry takes a rising share of nominal output
(unbalanced growth); and (c) the changing composition of output across stagnant and
dynamic industries reduces the effect of the productivity improvement on the average
productivity (adverse effect on productivity).
To gain intuition, we start with a simplified version of the model developed in the
previous section, where production in two sectors, manufacturing (m) and housing (h),
requires only labor
Y m = aLm, Y h = Lh,
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and a is the exogenous labor productivity in manufacturing. By perfect competition,
profit maximization, and perfect labor mobility W = qh = a, and per capita income is
simply
y = (Y m + qhY h)/L = (aLm + aLh)/L = a.
Now consider a steady state with a constant per-capita demand of the housing stock,
hd(pi,W ) where
W = a
pi = qh − (1− δ)qh/(1 + r) = a
(
δ + r
1 + r
)
for some exogenously fixed rate of interest, r. Since housing is the only source of
households’ wealth and qh = y = a, the wealth-to-income ratio is
β(a) ≡ q
hhd
y
= hd
(
a
(
δ + r
1 + r
)
, a
)
.
Then, the effect of a rising relative productivity on β(a) depends on the elasticities
of housing demand with respect to its own price (hˆdpi) and wage income (hˆ
d
W )
5. In
particular, the percentage change in β generated by a 1 percent increase in a is equal
to the sum of these two elasticities
∂β/β
∂a/a
= hˆdpi + hˆ
d
W .
Observe that, with an homothetic representation of preferences, β increases with a if
and only if housing demand is inelastic with respect to its own price, i.e., −hˆdpi < 1.
This condition squares with most empirical estimations. In fact, the general consensus
is that both income and price elasticities are relatively small in absolute value, the
first ranging between 0.5 to 1, and the second between -1 and -0.5 (for example, Mayo
5From now on, to simplify the notation, we use a ”hat” to denote partial elasticities, i.e., letting
h(x) be any differentiable function in Rn, we let hˆxi = ∂ log h(x)/∂ log xi.
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(1981) and Hansen et al. (1996)). In what follows, we show that this basic intuition
extends to a more sophisticated life-cycle economy with capital and land.
Now we show how the above example generalizes to the two-sector overlapping
generations economy with bequests and capital that we have introduced in the previous
section. We restate the Baumol’s cost disease result in the present framework as follows.
Define housing wealth as v ≡ qhh and the average income per-capita as
y = ym(1− λ) + qhyhλ/a. (31)
Since wealth includes capital and housing, the wealth-to-income-ratio is
β =
k + v
y
= βk + βh,
where βk = k/y is the business capital and βh = v/y the housing component. Then,
we say that there exists a housing cost disease if, at an equilibrium PBSS,
(ha) ∂qh/∂a > 0 (housing appreciation),
(iw) ∂β/∂a > 0 (increasing wealth-to-income ratio),
(in) ∂b/∂a > 0 (increasing wealth inequality).
It turns out that the emergence of a cost disease in the present model depends on the
properties of the demand side of the economy (demand elasticities) but also on the
magnitude of relative capital intensities and factor shares. In the remaining part of
this section we will provide a robust set of (plausible) conditions under which the set
of phenomena from (ha) to (sp) are verified.
From the CES preference specification we derive that the elasticities of consumption
and housing demand with respect to the user cost of housing, pi, are independent of
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individuals’ wealth. In particular,
1 + hˆdpi = (1− γ)(1− φh), sˆpi = −(1− γ)(1 + (1− φh))cy/s, (32)
where cy is the aggregate young-age consumption. In what follows we will be mostly
concentrate on the case of an inelastic demand for housing, i.e., γ < 1. As shown
above, this implies that a rise in the user cost of housing generates, ceteris paribus, a
rise in the demand for housing wealth and a fall in saving. On the contrary, if γ = 1,
then hˆdpi = −1 and sˆpi = 0.
Consider now the supply side of the model and define the sector-specific factor
shares (or output elasticities)
Sjk = f jkkj/f j, Shz = fhz z/fh, Shl = 1− Shk − Shz .
Then, we let the capital intensity differential across the two sectors be defined as
∆ =
(
δ + ζ
1 + r
)
Shk
(
akm − kh
kh
)
.
Observe that ∆ is a function of factor shares. In particular, Smk > Shk is a necessary
condition for the manufacturing sector to exhibit a higher capital intensity6, i.e., ∆ > 0.
To see the role of factor shares and capital intensities, start with equation (28) and
use the profit maximization condition (2) to express the share of labor in construction
in terms of the housing value
λ =
(δ + ζ)Shk
(1 + r)kh
av. (33)
6Note that Smk > Shk if and only if the housing price (qh) is decreasing in the interest rate (r).
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Using the above in (15) and (31), we obtain
k = km −∆v, (34)
y = ym − ((1 + r)∆− (δ + ζ)Shz )v, (35)
β = (km + (1−∆)v)/y. (36)
Equations (34)–(36) provide some intuition about the role of the assumed restrictions
on the relative capital intensity for the housing cost disease. In particular, when ∆
is positive and Shz is sufficiently small, all else unchanged, a larger housing wealth, v,
decreases k and y, and increases βh, both directly and through a fall in y. Provided
that ∆ < 1, a higher v may, in turn, generate a larger wealth-to-output ratio.
The next proposition summarizes the key results about the elasticities of the rele-
vant equilibrium variables with respect to a at a PBSS. From now on, we denote the
elasticity of a variable x with respect to a at equilibrium as xˆ∗a, where x may be one of
the steady state equilibrium values v, k, b, qh, λ, y or β. Evidently, these elasticities
take into account the direct and indirect effects of a changing a.
Proposition 1. Assume that 0 < ∆ < 1. Then, a PBSS (if it exists) is unique and it
has the following properties.
• If γ = 1 and σh = 1, a change in a is allocation neutral, in the sense that the
PBSS values v, b, k, y, λ and β are not affected by a.
• If, on the other hand, σh ≥ 1 and γ ≤ 1, with one strict inequality, and
∆ < 1−
(
δ + r
1 + r
)
φy
φy + φo
,
then, we have vˆ∗a > 0, bˆ
∗
a > 0.
• Finally, for σh close enough to 1 and small enough land share Shz , we have (see
the appendix for details)
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yˆ∗a < 0, βˆ
∗
a > 0, kˆ
∗
a < 0 and λˆ
∗
a > 0.
Hence, the unit-elastic economy, defined by σh = γ = 1, is a benchmark case in
which a change in a generates no change in all the relevant variables. On the other
hand, when the housing demand becomes relatively inelastic (γ < 1), an increase in
a generates a reallocation of resources towards the housing sector. Namely, housing
wealth and bequests are complementary and increase with the housing price. Observe
that the rise in the housing price is independent of the land scarcity by the assumption
that the land to labor ratio in the construction sector, z, is constant. If land permits
were to increase less than proportionally relative to the amount of labor efficiency in
construction, the impact of a on qh would be magnified.
The assumptions used in the propositions are motivated by analytical tractability
and by the objective to make the housing cost disease a likely outcome under some
additional intuitive conditions. In particular, the assumption that the capital intensity
in manufacturing is higher than in the construction sector is a key restriction for
generating the rising wealth-to-income ratios that are part of the housing cost disease
defined in this paper. The same is true for the assumption γ < 1. The restriction
∆ ∈ (0, 1) guarantees a ”well behaved” comparative statics for the system of equations
defining a PBSS (local uniqueness). The reader can find more intuition and details
in appendix A.I. In addition, ∆ < 1 is a requirement for a meaningful steady state
equilibrium when bequests are not too large. In particular, in section A.II of the
appendix we show that this upper bound must be verified for the existence of an
equilibrium with positive output in the construction sector, under the assumption that
aggregate saving falls short of the wage bill.
What is the empirical support for the assumptions that we impose to generate a
housing cost disease? In the literature, there is consistent support for the assumption
that the construction sector is less capital intensive than manufacturing and little
consensus on the most plausible values for the elasticity of substitution between capital
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and labor. In any case, it is important to stress that the above assumptions are not
necessary, bur rather they provide with the most favorable environment for the housing
cost disease. In particular, the low price elasticity in the demand for the output of the
stagnant sector is one of the key assumption in Baumol (1967)’s model. We observe that
there exists strong evidence that housing demand responds less than proportionally to a
rise in price. In particular, Hanushek and Quigley (1980), Mayo (1981) and Ermisch et
al. (1996) provide estimates of the housing demand elasticity in the range (−0.8,−0.5).
Similarly, Ngai and Pissarides (2007) assumes a low (i.e., below one) elasticity of
substitution across final goods in order to show that employment is gradually shifting
to sectors with low productivity growth. In our model, a rise in relative efficiency
in manufacturing determines an increase in the relative price of housing with a small
effect on the demand of this good. Therefore, the demand for housing wealth (v = qh)
increases with a and we observe a reallocation of production and labor to the less
productive sector. The assumption that ∆ > 0 has no analogous counterpart in the
literature following the Baumol’s cost disease proposition.
5 Quantitative Analysis
In this section, first we evaluate the consequences of a rising relative efficiency in man-
ufacturing on stationary equilibrium variables and show the impact of the housing cost
disease on housing prices, wealth ratios and inequality under more general assump-
tions. In particular, we assume Cobb-Douglas technology in manufacturing, and CES
with elasticity of substitution σh in construction. Second, we consider the special case
of Cobb-Douglas technology in both sectors and look at the transition between two
different steady states.
Table 1 reports all the parameters used in the comparative static between different
steady states. Preferences are of the CES class as defined in equation (23). We set the
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coefficients of the CES utility function in order to match the expenditure shares φj,
for j = y, o, h, to some stylized facts for the US economy. First, we set χh = 0.20 to
match the US households expenditure on housing services (approximately 15% of 2015
GDP according to the BEA NIPA Table 2.3.5). To calibrate the coefficients attached
to the consumption expenditure of young (χy) and old (χo) individuals we use the
fact that, in the US in 2014, older people (aged 65 or more) are approximately 13%
of the population (World Development Indicators from World Bank Data). Assuming
that the consumption shares of young and old follow their shares in the population
we set the weights χy and χo, respectively, to 0.70 and 0.10. Following Ogaki and
Reinhart (1998), we set the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution for the households’
preferences, γ, to a number smaller than 1 and, in particular, equal to 0.57. Recall
that in the PBSS, for the two-type of households’ case (i.e., rich and poor), described
in section 3, the real interest rate is pinned down by the preference for altruism of
the rich household. We set the real interest rate to match the average real return
on US Treasury of about 1.5% per year. Therefore, for a holding period of 25 years,
corresponding to a generation, we set r = 0.28. The depreciation of the housing
stock is set equal to δ = 20%, implying complete depletion over five generations as in
Deaton and Laroque (2001). We use O’Mahony and Timmer (2009)’s KLEMS data to
have rough estimates of the capital factor shares in construction and manufacturing
in the US over the 1970–2010 period and, accordingly, set αm = 0.40 and αh = 0.10.
These numbers are in line with those in Valentinyi and Herrendorf (2008) who set the
capital share in manufacturing and construction respectively to 0.4 and 0.2. Therefore,
the empirical evidence supports our assumption that the manufacturing sector is more
capital intensive than the housing sector. Note that while technology in manufacturing
7Note that if γ = 0.5, the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution is smaller than 1. In order to
match asset prices data Bansal et al. (2008) use a relatively high value of 1.5. Previous literature had
estimated a much lower value, closer to zero, through direct estimates of the first order conditions
of the solution of the optimal intertemporal consumer problem (cf. (Hall, 1988)). Standard RBC
literature has been used a value of 0.66, estimated by Kydland and Prescott (1982).
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is Cobb-Douglas, we assume a more general CES specification for the housing sector.
Therefore, while αm corresponds to the model implied capital share of manufacturing
output, αh = 0.10 is only approximately corresponding to the capital share in housing
production. Similarly, we set the weight attached to the land input to ηh = 0.10,
which is the same value used by Davis and Heathcote (2005). Neels (1982) provides
an estimate of the output elasticity of land (i.e., our measure of Shz ) between 0.03 and
0.06, while Knoll et al. (2017) considers a even larger value and argue that the land
share of value added in construction is large, and close to 50%. There is no consensus
in the empirical literature on the value of the elasticity of substitution between capital
and labor. For example, while Piketty and Zucman (2014) assume a value greater then
one, Antras (2004) find values smaller than 1 and Chirinko (2008) defines a range of
values between 0.4 and 0.6. Regarding the elasticity between land and capital, Ahlfeldt
and McMillen (2014) find values close to 1. We assume the same value for the elasticity
between capital and labor, and capital and land, in the housing sector and set it to
σh = 1.5. Finally, we set the population’s growth rate to n = 0% and the steady state
growth rate of labor augmenting productivity in each sector to g = 0.65, implying an
annual growth rate of 2 percent. As discussed in section 3, we assume a land policy
such that z is invariant. We leave for future work the analysis of a change in the
land supply and of population growth on wealth ratios, housing and land prices, and
inequality.
We are interested in evaluating the long-run effects of productivity improvements
and figures 1 summarize our main results. According to our estimates using O’Mahony
and Timmer (2009)’s KLEMS data, on average, across the eight largest developed
economies, relative labor efficiency in manufacturing increased approximately by 75
percent between 1970 to 20108. Therefore, we plot the percentage changes in the
8See the discussion in section 6 and the separate online appendix available on our web sites for
details on the estimation of the relative labor efficiency, and a country breakdown of its evolution over
the period 1970–2010, using O’Mahony and Timmer (2009)’s KLEMS data.
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Table 1: Model’s Parameters
Preferences
Weight consumption young: χy 0.70
Weight consumption old: χo 0.10
Weight housing services: χh 0.20
Elasticity of substitution preferences: γ 0.50
Interest rate: r 0.67
Technology
Housing depreciation: δ 0.20
Capital share in housing: αh 0.10
Land share in housing: ηh 0.10
Capital share in manufacturing: αm 0.40
Elasticity of substitution housing: σh 1.50
Economy structure
Population growth rate: n 0.00
Sectoral productivity growth rate (%): g 0.65
Notes: This table reports the parameters used to simulate the model for different steady-states corresponding to
different values of the exogenous relative efficiency in manufacturing a. For robustness, we also run simulations for
values of σh = 1 (i.e., Cobb-Douglas technology). The real interest rate r corresponds to a holding period equal to a
generation.
steady-state values of the main variables of the model for different levels of the relative
efficiency in manufacturing a = 1, . . . , 1.75 with respect to their values when a = 1. We
consider two different cases for the elasticity between inputs in the construction sector:
in our baseline specification σh is greater than one and equal to 1.5 (red-dashed line);
alternatively, we consider the case of σh = 1, i.e., Cobb-Douglas (blue-solid line). We
find that total wealth and housing wealth increase with the improvements in relative
productivity (by 7.5 and 27 percent respectively for the baseline case). On the contrary,
business capital declines by approximately 3 percent. The large increase in housing
wealth goes along a strong increase in the housing price (approximately 60 percent),
and labor share in construction (approximately 25 percent) as labor moves toward the
relatively stagnant sector. Note that, despite the large increase in the simulations,
housing wealth as a share of total wealth stays always below 50 percent, in line with
data. Similarly, despite the strong rise in λ, the share of workers in construction
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remains close to 5 percent in all cases.
Finally, we plot total bequests, our measure of inequality, as a fraction of total
income. Bequests increase modestly with the improvements in relative productivity
(approximately 3.5 percent). In the eight largest advanced economies, over the period
1970–2010, national wealth-to-income increased by approximately 60 percent, housing
wealth by 112 percent and real housing prices by 53 percent and, in some countries
like Italy and France, close to 100 percent. Therefore, our model is able to explain a
fraction of the historical increase of these variables without relying on alternative, in
our view complementary, explanations like skilled-biased technological change, the role
of equity and financial markets, and less progressive tax systems. In addition, we have
de facto shut down the effect of land scarcity and population growth which are also
likely to have a role.
Figure 1: Comparative statics: response to an increase in a
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Notes: This figure plots the percentage changes in the steady-state values of total (β), housing (βh), and non-housing
(βk) wealth-to-income ratios; the bequests-to-income ratio (b/y), the share of workers in construction (λ) and the
housing price (qh) for different values of the relative productivity sector a = 1, . . . , 1.75, with respect to their value
when a = 1. The red-dashed line is for the baseline value of the elasticity of substitution in the housing sector, σh = 1.5.
The blue solid lines corresponds to Cobb-Douglas technology in the housing sector (σh = 1). Note that only for housing
price the upper limit of the vertical axis is 75, while in all the other plots is 25.
Note that the fact that our model is fairly stylized has some costs. For example,
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our 2-type assumption implies that only a very small fraction of the population leaves
any bequests and drives wealth inequality. Furthermore, while our numerical exercise
compares different steady-states, the long-run trends in the data might combine differ-
ent steady states and transitions within a given steady-state. In what follows, we look
in greater detail at the transition between two different steady states. For the sake
of simplicity, we consider the model laid out in section 2, but assume that production
functions in manufacturing and housing are both Cobb-Douglas. We further assume
that the economy starts from a level of relative productivity equal to a0 and moves
toward a higher level a > a0, with a > 1 according to the following law of motion
ln at+1 = µ ln at + (1− µ) ln a.
We log-linearize the model around the new steady state, function of a, and study
the transition to a starting from a lower level of the relative productivity equal to a0.
We set the initial values of the predetermined variables (i.e., the levels of capital and
bequest) to their steady state values at a0 and study the adjustment toward a. All the
main parameters are the same as in table 1. In figure 2 we present our results. Relative
manufacturing productivity starts about 20 percent below the new steady state and
converges to a at the exogenous rate µ = 0.8. The housing price (q), the value of the
stock of housing (v) and the level of bequests (b) all increase in the adjustment to the
new steady state.
In this section, we presented quantitative results of the model showing that it
generates a strong housing cost disease. Despite the fact that manufacturing sector
represents a small share to total valued added, changes in relative labor-augmenting
efficiency have the potential to generate large long-run increases in housing prices and
wealth ratios. In the next section, we evaluate the empirical support of our main
conjecture using a sample of advanced economies.
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Figure 2: Transition between steady states: response to an increase in a
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Notes: The figure reports the dynamics of the relative manufacturing productivity (a), housing price (q), value of
housing stock (v), and level of bequests (b) in the adjustment to a new steady state characterized by a > 1 starting
from a lower value a0 < a. The horizontal axis denotes time-periods. All variables are in log difference with respect to
their steady state values. The dynamics is obtained by a version of the model described in section 2, with Cobb-Douglas
production functions in both sectors, linearized around the new steady state. The initial values of the predetermined
variables are those corresponding to the steady state under a0.
6 Empirical Estimation
In this section, we show that, in a panel of advanced economies, a long-run increase
in the relative productivity in the rest of the economy with respect to construction is
associated with an increase in the wealth-to-income ratio. We collect annual wealth
data from Piketty and Zucman (2014), who have put together an incredibly rich dataset
on wealth and income, starting from national accounts data, for the period 1970–2010,
for the largest eight developed economies: the United States, Germany, the United
Kingdom, Canada, Japan, France, Italy and Australia9. All assets and liabilities are
valued at prevailing market prices. Private wealth is net wealth of households, and
assets include all non-financial and financial assets. Public wealth is net wealth of public
administrations and government agencies. National wealth is the sum of private and
9For a smaller subset of countries, Piketty and Zucman (2014) provide longer time-series. However,
we choose to restrict our focus on a time-period for which we could maximize the number of countries
in the sample and with more reliable data. For additional details on the data refer to the online
appendix to this paper or directly to Piketty and Zucman (2014).
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public wealth. While the financial component of private wealth includes households’
holdings of domestic public debt, at the national level holdings of domestic debt are
netted out. Housing wealth is one of the components of total wealth, and it measures
the net value of households’ real-estate holdings10. As public debt should not be part
of individuals’ net (of the present value of future taxes) wealth over the long run,
in this section we focus on national, rather than private, wealth, and on one of its
main component, namely housing wealth, while we present data on private wealth in
a separate online appendix available on our web sites. We combine data on wealth
ratios, for the eight largest advanced economies, with data on relative productivity in
the rest of the economy with respect to construction, estimated from the O’Mahony
and Timmer (2009)’s EU KLEMS Growth and Productivity Accounts. For some of the
countries in the sample data start after 1970: in this case, we extend the series by linear
interpolation to obtain a balanced panel, but results of the unbalanced panel, presented
in the online appendix, are virtually unchanged. Since manufacturing is only a small
share of total value added (i.e., approximately 13% in the US), we estimate relative
productivity by feeding data on gross value added, capital and labor inputs, to the
production functions of each sector defined in (1) and considering ”Total industries”
(TOT) as the empirical counterpart for the rest of the economy11. In particular, relative
labor efficiency is estimated under the assumption of Cobb-Douglas production function
in the general economy, and CES with elasticity smaller than unity in construction.
In the eight largest economies, national wealth increased substantially more than
income over the period 1970 to 2010. In particular, the national wealth-to-income ratio
10Note that in the computation of net housing wealth, financial liabilities, such as mortgages, are
netted out the housing stock value. On the contrary, in the model v denotes gross housing wealth. It
is possible to show that, in the model, poor households have lower financial wealth than the rich and
they are borrowers when 1 + φo/φh < (1 + g)(r + δ)/(1 + r) a condition that can be verified only if
g > (1− δ)/(r + δ).
11In KLEMS’s data, ”total industries” include all the sectors of the economy. Note that, follow-
ing the technological assumptions spelled out in section 2, we assume that productivity is labor-
augmenting, rather than affecting all the factors of production. Therefore, we are implicitly capturing
relative changes in the quality of labor in different sectors of the economy.
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increased by about 60 percent. Interestingly, housing wealth increased even more, on
average by about 112 percent. There exist important cross-country differences. For
example, Italy is the country with the largest increase in the ratio between both national
and housing wealth-to-income: 135 and 218 percent, respectively. On the contrary, in
the US the national wealth-to-income ratio increased only by 6 percent, while housing
wealth-to-income decreased by about 19 percent12. Since wealth is typically unevenly
distributed, it is not surprising that, over the same period, income and wealth inequality
increased along with the wealth-to-income ratio. In particular, using data in Alvaredo
et al. (2016)’s Top World Income Database, we note that, on average, the shares going
to the top 1 and 10 percent of the income distribution increased, respectively, by 46
and 20 percent. Similarly, also the shares going to the top 1 and 10 percent of the
wealth distribution increased, by approximately 18 and 7 percent. While the US is the
country with the smallest increase in the wealth-to-income ratio, it is also the country
with the largest increase in both income and wealth inequality. In fact, the shares
going to the top 1 and 10 percent of the income distribution increased, respectively, by
123 and 47 percent; those going to the top 1 and 10 percent of the wealth distribution
increased, respectively, by 20 and 11 percent.
We plot in figure 3 our estimates for the relative labor efficiency, both for the case
of unitary elasticity of substitution in housing production (green line), and elasticity
smaller than one and equal to σh = 0.6 (black line). With the exception of Italy, the
effect of σh on our estimates is second order. The US, Japan and Italy are the countries
with the largest increase in relative efficiency, in the period 1970–2010. In the rest of
the countries in our sample the increase is more modest.
In order to evaluate the empirical support to our conjecture, we estimate a panel
in which we relate the averages over seven years of national wealth ratios and relative
12In the separate online appendix we show that these figures are robust to ending the sample in
2007, before the Great Recession, and to computing percentage changes using five-year averages at
the beginning and end of the sample.
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Figure 3: Relative Labor Efficiency in Manufacturing
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Notes: This figure plots two measures of relative labor efficiency in the rest of the economy, with respect to the
construction sector, for the US, Germany, the UK, Canada, Japan, France, Italy and Australia for the period 1970–
2010. Relative labor efficiency is estimated as residual assuming Cobb-Douglas technology in manufacturing, and either
Cobb-Douglas (green lines) or CES (black lines) technology in housing construction. The elasticity of substitution for
the CES technology is set to σh = 1.5. All series are normalized to 1 in 1970.
productivities. Table 2 summarizes the main results. In particular, in regressions
(1)–(4) all variables are averages over non-overlapping seven years periods (i.e., 1976–
70, 1983–77, 1990–84, 1997–91, 2005–98). In regression (5), we instead directly use
yearly data and extend the sample to 2010. In regression (1) we estimate a panel with
country fixed effect and relative productivity as the only regressor. The coefficient on
relative productivity is large and significant at the 5% level indicating that unbalanced
growth of productivity in manufacturing is associated to an increase in the national
wealth ratios. In regression (2) we use robust standard errors clustered at the country
level and show that the coefficient on relative productivity is still significant at the
5 percent level. In regression (3) we introduce time fixed-effect, which absorbs part
of the explanatory power of relative productivity. In fact, the coefficient drops from
3.78 to 2.24 and coefficient is significant only at the 15 percent confidence level. In
regression (4) we include additional regressors, that further absorbs the explanatory
power of relative productivity: the coefficient drops to approximately 2 but remains
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significant at the 10 percent confidence level%13. In particular, we include the log of the
population, the growth rate of real income, the private saving rate and the real capital
gains in national wealth. All these additional regressors are not statistically significant.
Finally, in regression (5) we estimate the full model on yearly data. The coefficient
on relative productivity is smaller, but statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
Therefore, our panel estimates provide empirical support for the housing cost disease
conjecture, even though we note that standard errors are large in part because of the
small number of countries in the sample.
Our empirical findings are subject to several issues. First, the sample’s small num-
ber of countries and limited time-length. Second, possible measurement errors in both
Piketty and Zucman (2014) and O’Mahony and Timmer (2009)’s data and our measure
of relative labor efficiency. Third, we do not control for alternative explanations of the
long-run increase in wealth ratios which we consider complementary, rather than com-
petitive, to our story. In the separate online appendix we address some of these issues,
for example by considering the relationship between housing prices, a key driver of
housing wealth, and relative productivity improvements, for a larger sample of sixteen
OECD countries.
In the next section, we evaluates the implications of the housing cost disease in
terms of welfare.
7 Welfare
In this section we address the housing cost disease problem from a welfare point of
view and try to evaluate whether, according to our model, the fact that housing takes
a large share of private wealth is undesirable.
13Note that we use robust standard errors clustered at the country level to account for possible
autocorrelation of the residuals and heteroskedasticy. However, as the number of countries is small,
clustered standard errors could increase the likelihood of failing to reject the null when the null is
false. In the separate online appendix we show that standard errors not clustered at the country level
tend to be lower.
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Table 2: Panel Estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES NWI NWI NWI NWI NWI
RTFP 3.781*** 3.781*** 2.243* 2.033** 0.493**
(0.707) (0.778) (1.333) (1.120) (0.286)
LPOP 0.198 -0.273
(1.586) (0.483)
GRI -2.437 -4.276***
(13.771) (1.698)
PSR -3.018 -2.652***
(3.580) (1.082)
CAPG 1.277 2.497***
(5.452) (0.878)
Observations 40 40 40 40 328
R-squared 0.480 0.480 0.639 0.651 0.640
Number of id 8 8 8 8 8
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES
TIME FE NO NO YES YES YES
Clustered SE NO YES YES YES YES
YEARS 1970-05 1970-05 1970-05 1970-05 1970-10
FREQ. 7 years 7 years 7 years yearly 7 years
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.05, ** p<0.1, * p<0.15
Notes: The dependent variable is national wealth-to-income (NWI). The regressors are the relative productivity in
manufacturing (RTFP), the log of the population (LPOP), the rate of growth of real income (GRI), the private saving
rate (PSR), and the real capital gains on national wealth (CAPG). In columns 1 to 4 all the variables are averages over
7 years non overlapping time periods. In column 5 we use yearly values.
Within a similar overlapping generations model, Deaton and Laroque (2001) find
that the presence of a demand for housing in a growing economy generates a portfolio
reallocation away from capital and towards housing, causing the accumulation of capital
to fall short of the Golden Rule level, and they consider this as possible reason for
confiscating property and giving it to consumers at no charge. It should be noted,
however, that allocations departing from the Golden Rule are inconsistent with a social
optimum only if we endorse a specific social welfare criterion, such as a weighted sum
of all generations’ utilities with rate of time preference equal to the population growth
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rate. In fact, any market allocation at which the rate of interest is larger than the
population growth rate is Pareto optimal and, in these cases, reducing the value of the
housing stock may have adverse effects on some generation’s welfare. Conversely, when
the real interest rate falls short of the population growth rate, a case that, in our model,
can only occur with zero bequests, Pareto improvements can be obtained by decreasing
investment in housing as well as in the capital stock. In other words, the crowding-out
of capital induced by housing demand and the inter-generational transfers may, in fact,
be desirable to avoid an over-accumulation of capital. Piketty (2014) advocates a tax
on wealth based on the argument that a rising wealth to income ratio may lead to
increasing inequality.
In any case, there are a number of reasons why a welfare analysis may be interesting.
First, since rising housing prices generate more bequests and wealth inequality, the
housing cost disease may be social welfare diminishing from an egalitarian perspective
(although, due to heterogeneous discount rates, some inequality is compatible with
an egalitarian planning optimum). Second, since, in a competitive equilibrium, poor
households would like to force gifts from children and, therefore, leave no bequests
because of one-sided altruism, raising the poor old individuals’ wealth may improve
social welfare. Then, a rise in housing prices may relax the non-negativity constraint
on bequest values and generate the increase in old age consumption that the market
is preventing under one-sided altruism. Third, a housing appreciation may decrease
welfare as it makes housing less affordable.
We compute the effect of an unanticipated rise in the level of the relative labor
efficiency, a = Am/Ah, at t = 0, at a stationary equilibrium such that the poor-type
households leave zero bequests and the rich-type leave positive bequests at all periods
(i.e., PBSS). Recall that, for all households of type i born at time t ≥ 0, welfare is
measured by
V t,i = u(Cy,it , C
o,i
t+1, H
i
t+1) + (θi(1 + n))V
t+1,i. (37)
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Assuming (as in section 3) that u(.) is homothetic, θi(1 + ζ) < 1, and recalling the
notation
cy,i = Cy,i/Amt , C
o,i
t /A
m
t = c
o,i, hi = H it/A
m
t ,
we derive the steady state evaluation of dynasty i’s welfare as
V i =
u(cy,i, (1 + g)co,i, (1 + g)hi)
1− θi(1 + ζ) ,
where the above time invariant variables are computed at the PBSS with 1 + r = 1/θr.
The effect of a rise in the relative productivity on the steady state households’ welfare
is, then,
∂V i
∂a
= µi
(
∂cy,i
∂a
+
ui2
ui1
(1 + g)
∂co,i
∂a
+
ui3
ui1
(1 + g)
∂V i
∂a
)
, (38)
where µi = ui1(1 − θi(1 + ζ))−1. Now recall that the households’ lifetime budget
constraint at steady state and the first order conditions from utility maximization
imply
cy,i + (1 + g)co,i/(1 + r) + (1 + g)qh(r + δ)hi/(1 + r) = w + bi(r − ζ)/(1 + r),
and ui2/u
i
1 = 1 + r, u
i
3/u
i
1 = q
h(r + δ)/(1 + r). Then, using these in (38), we derive
∂V i
∂a
= µi
(
1 + ζ
1 + r
)((
r − ζ
1 + ζ
)
∂bi
∂a
−
(
r + δ
1 + n
)
hi
∂qh
∂a
)
. (39)
Therefore, for the poor household, a housing price appreciation following an improve-
ment in the level of manufacturing productivity relative to construction, a, is always
welfare reducing, whereas it can be welfare augmenting for the rich households only
if equilibrium bequests are positively affected by a. Observe, however, that the above
evaluation only considers the lifetime welfare of the young generations at steady state.
A complete welfare analysis should take into account the effect of a rising a on the
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old households at the time in which this productivity shock is occurring. Since old
individuals’ housing ownership was acquired in young age, the change in a does not
affect the amount of their own housing stock and services, but a higher housing price
increases their wealth allowing for higher old age consumption and bequests. Provided
that their financial wealth is not too large, the cohort of initial old households are likely
to gain.
8 Conclusions
In this paper we show that a Baumol’s cost disease could complement alternative ex-
isting theories in explaining the increase in total and housing wealth-to-income ratios
and wealth inequality that took place in the eight largest advanced economies in the
last forty years. To show this, we have employed a simple life-cycle model with no fi-
nancial frictions, two sectors (construction and manufacturing) and one-sided parental
altruism. Key assumptions are that the construction sector is less capital intensive
than manufacturing and housing demand sufficiently inelastic. Under these assump-
tions, a rise in labor efficiency in manufacturing produces a strong upward pressure on
housing prices, a rise in the total and housing wealth-to-income ratios and a rise in be-
quests. The increase in housing valuations can possibly mitigate (relative to the First
Best level) the beneficial effects of a rising productivity in manufacturing under an
egalitarian welfare criterion when market allocations imply high enough consumption
inequality and low enough heterogeneity in parental altruism. The empirical evidence
supports our theoretical findings: there exists a positive link between relative produc-
tivity in the general economy, with respect to construction, and wealth ratios in the
eight largest economies in the period 1970–2010.
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Appendix (for publication)†
A Comparative Statics
A.I Proof of proposition 1
We reduce the whole equilibrium system at a PBSS to two equations and two unknowns.
The two equations are the market clearing condition in the housing market and the
capital market equilibrium; the two unknowns are the rich households’ bequests, b, and
the value of housing wealth, v. In particular, by equation (28), (28), we derive
λ =
(
δ + ζ
1 + r
)
av
Shk
kh
≡ λ(v, a), (A1)
k = km − λ(v, a)(km − kh/a). (A2)
The above imply that k is a function of v and a to be denoted as k(v, a) and such that
kv = −∆, ka = (λ/a) (1− σh)km.
Now we use the market clearing conditions for housing and capital markets (29), (30)
at steady state to derive the excess demand for housing wealth and the excess supply
of saving (over investment)
Gd(b, v, a) ≡ (qhφh(pi, r)/pi)(w + ((r − ζ)/(1 + r))b)− (1 + ζ)v, (A3)
Gs(b, v, a) ≡ (1− φy)w + (1− φy((r − ζ)/(1 + r)))b− (1 + ζ)(k + v), (A4)
so that the reduced form equilibrium steady state conditions for any given a is defined
by
Gd(b, v, a) = 0, (A5)
Gs(b, v, a) = 0, (A6)
and a PBSS is a positive pair, (b∗(a), v∗(a)), such that
0 = Gd(b∗(a), v∗(a), a) = Gs(b∗(a), v∗(a), a). (A7)
†This appendix is intended for publication. An additional online appendix, not for publication, is
available on our websites and contains details on the data and further robustness checks.
42
Letting vd(b, a) and vs(b, a) be the solutions for v to (A5) and (A6), respectively, for
a given pair (b, a), we say that vd is the demand and vs the supply of housing wealth.
Intuitively, vd is the households’ real expenditure for the stock of available housing
and vs defines the amount of housing wealth that is consistent with a capital market
equilibrium, i.e., with the available amount of savings, business capital and land value.
It turns out that, if σh = 1 and ∆ ∈ (0, 1), the demand and supply schedules, i.e.,
vd(b, a) and vs(b, a) in the space (b, v), are well defined, have a unique intersection at
b∗(a), where vs is steeper than vd (i.e., vsb > v
d
b ). This follows also from a key property
of our model, i.e., the fact that a rise in bequests has a greater impact on households’
saving than on their expenditure on housing (cf. equation (24)).
Now we show that, if σh = 1 and ∆ ∈ (0, 1), the solutions vd(b, a) and vs(b, a) to
(A5) and (A6), if they exist, are unique and such that vsb > v
d
b . In fact, by differentiation
of equations (A3), (A4), it follows that, when σh = 1,
Gdv = −1, Gsv = −(1−∆),
and, hence, by the stated assumptions,
−Gdv = 1 > −Gsv > 0. (A8)
Then,
∂vd
∂b
=
(r − ζ)φh
(1 + ζ)(r + δ)
,
∂vs
∂b
=
(1 + r)− (r − ζ)φy
(1 + ζ)(1 + r)(1−∆) .
Then, since 1−∆ ∈ (0, 1), a sufficient condition for vsb > vdb is
(r − ζ)((1 + r)φh + (r + δ)φy) ≤ (r + δ)(1 + r),
which is clearly verified for all φy and φh such that φy + φh ≤ 1.
Denoting the elasticity of a variable x with respect to a at equilibrium as xˆ∗a, we
can compute now the impact of a change in a on the equilibrium values of bequests
and housing wealth, as
bˆ∗a =
vˆda − vˆsa
vˆsb − vˆdb
, vˆ∗a = vˆ
d
a + vˆ
d
b bˆ
∗
a,
where, for j = d, s,
vˆja = −
aGja
vGjv
, vˆjb = −
aGjb
vGjv
.
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Since we have shown that ∆ < 1 implies vˆsb > vˆ
d
b , we derive that
bˆ∗a ≥ 0 ⇔ vˆda ≥ vˆsa.
By taking derivatives, we get
vˆda = (1− γ)(1− Shk )(1− φh),
vˆsa =
1
1−∆
[
(1− γ)(1− Shk )
(
δ + r
1 + r
)
φy + a
(
δ + ζ
1 + r
)
Shk
km
kh
(1− σh)
]
.
Then, a sufficient condition for bˆ∗a ≥ 0 is γ ≤ 1, σh ≥ 1 and
0 ≤ ∆ ≤ 1−
(
δ + r
1 + r
)
φy
φy + φo
.
Since
vˆ∗a = vˆa + vˆb × bˆ∗a, vˆa ≥ 0, vˆb ≥ 0,
the above inequalities guarantee vˆ∗a ≥ 0 and bˆ∗a = 0 if γ = 1 and σh = 1. Now,
assume σh = 1. Then using (34), (35), (36), we derive
kˆ∗a = −(∆/βk)βhvˆ∗a,
yˆ∗a = −((1 + r)∆− (δ + ζ)Shz )βhvˆ∗a,
βˆ∗a = ((1−∆)/β) + ((1 + r)∆− (δ + ζ)Shz )βhvˆ∗a,
λˆ∗a = vˆ
∗
a.
A.II Upper Bound on ∆ with Zero Bequests
Proposition 2. Assume that b = 0. Then, ∆ < 1 at equilibrium.
Proof. If br = 0, aggregate savings cannot be larger than the wage rate, i.e., s ≤ aw.
We are going to show that this is impossible at equilibrium when ∆ > 1. In fact, since
∆ = (δ + ζ)(akm − kh)/qhyh, we have
1−∆ = q
hyh − (δ + ζ)(akm − kh)
qhyh
. (A9)
Now consider the asset market clearing condition (30) at steady state, i.e.,
s/(1 + ζ) = k + v = λkh/a+ (1− λ)km + v.
44
Since v = λqhyh/a(δ + ζ), the above can be written as
λ
a
(qhyh − (δ + ζ)(akm − kh)) = δ + ζ
1 + ζ
(s− (1 + ζ)km),
or, in light of (A9),
λ
a
(1−∆)qhyh =
(
δ + n
1 + n
)
(s− (1 + ζ)km).
Now let 1−∆ < 0. Then, λ ∈ [0, 1] if and only if s < (1 + ζ)akm and
s >
(
1 + ζ
δ + ζ
)(
qhyh + (δ + ζ)kh
a
)
> w.
Since zero bequests imply s ≤ w, the above cannot hold in equilibrium.
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